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Abstract
Bank runs are relatively rare events characterized by highly pessimistic
depositorsexpectations. How would pessimistic depositors expect to be
treated in a bank run? How will this a¤ect their behavior? How can
banks handle this kind of risk? In the framework of a Diamond-Dybvig-
Peck-Shell banking model, in which a broad class of feasible contractual
arrangements (including suspension schemes) is allowed and which ad-
mits a run equilibrium, we analyze a scenario in which depositors are
uncertain of their treatment should a run occur. We check whether bank
runs are more likely or less likely to happen, in particular, if depositors
are maxmin decision makers. We assess the utility of suspension schemes
in the presence of pessimistic bank runners.
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1 Introduction
Starting from the seminal Diamond and Dybvigs (1983) paper (D-D hence-
forth), a stream of literature has developed which looks at bank runs as phe-
nomena originating from a coordination failure driven by an extrinsic random
variable, namely a sunspot. D-D have in fact constructed a simple banking
model in which the optimal demand deposit contract gives rise to two equi-
libria: a good equilibrium, in which depositors truthfully reveal their type
(impatient or patient) and act accordingly (run or wait); a bad equilibrium
(bank run), in which all depositors, independently of their type, decide to run to
the bank, driven by an irrational shift of expectationswhich makes them be-
lieve that everybody else is running. If there is no aggregate uncertainty (that
is, if the bank knows how many patients and impatients populate the econ-
omy), then the total suspension of convertibility (TSC) eliminates the bank run
equilibrium. Under aggregate uncertainty TSC is not implementable - simply
because the bank does not know where to stop in returning deposits -, and the
alternative solution proposed by D-D is the deposit insurance. Wallace (1988)
has however criticized the - feasibility of the - optimal contract under aggregate
uncertainty designed by D-D by arguing that, in it, the sequential service con-
straint (SSC) is indeed not taken seriously1 . Wallace (1990) has then proven
1The solution under aggregate uncertainty proposed by D-D requires that the bank nd the
optimal contract as a function of the proportions of the two types (that it does not know yet)
and that, after each depositor has contacted the bank and revealed her true type (which she is
going to do, since the incentive compatibility constraint is satised), the bank eventually comes
to know these proportions and is then able to implement the optimal contract. The Wallaces
(1988) criticism is concerned with the assumption that the bank be able to observe each
agents type before starting the distribution of pay-o¤s to the depositors. This assumption is
in fact not in line with the sequential service constraint, which is inspired by a rst come-rst
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that, under aggregate uncertainty and SSC taken seriously, partial suspension
of convertibility (PSC) characterizes the optimal banking contract, because it
enhances the risk-sharing among depositors.
In enlarging the set of feasible contractual arrangements from the simple
contracting (the demand deposit contract) to a class of banking mechanisms
that allow for suspension schemes2 , Wallace (1990) has brought about a signi-
cant departure from the original D-D framework, and has inspired a number of
subsequent works in this eld. An important contribution along these lines is
Peck and Shell (JPE, 2003), which designs a banking model admitting a multi-
plicity of equilibria (one of which being a bank run), and further develops the
issue of the selection among them. Peck and Shell (2003) can be interpreted
as a response to the banking model developed by Green and Lin (2000), whose
optimal mechanism only admits the good equilibrium. Peck and Shell (2003) in
fact show that 1. the non-existence of the bank run equilibrium in Green and
Lin (2000) crucially depends upon the - unrealistic - assumption that depositors
know exactly their position in the queue to the bank; and that 2. bank run equi-
libria re-emerge as soon as depositors are assumed to have only a probabilistic
knowledge of their place in line.
This paper enters the debate about the existence of sunspot-driven bank
runs. It suggests that, once a class of banking mechanisms including suspension
servedprinciple, and which thus implies that the pay-o¤ to each depositor is to be given as
soon as she gets to the bank.
2Allowing for suspension schemes simply means that the bank, in nding the optimal
contract, is allowed to assign di¤erent pay-o¤s across depositors as a function of their place
in line.
3
schemes is taken into account, panic crises may disappear exactly because of
depositorsuncertain beliefs about how they will be treated in the case of panic.
In Peck and Shell (2003) depositors evaluate each place in line as equally likely
independently of whether or not a bank run is expected. We further weaken
the assumption about the depositorsprior beliefs by assuming that, not only
do these depositors not know exactly their position in the queue, but they also
have an impreciseprobabilistic knowledge of their position when expecting a
run.
Uncertainty here is to be intended in the sense, rst given by Knight (1921),
that the information of each depositor is too vague to be represented by a (sin-
gle additive) probability distribution. We suppose that, when each depositor
expects a bank run to occur, she feels no longer able to evaluate reliably the
probability distribution of her position number in the queue. Bank runs are
in fact relatively rare events, thereby preventing depositors from forming well
informed expectations on their position should such an event occur. In particu-
lar, as we will clarify below, the patient depositor might fear to be unfavorably
treated by the bank in the case she runs and, because of that, might be even-
tually discouraged from running.
This situation closely resembles the one depicted in the Ellsberg paradox
(Ellsberg (1961)): two urns are given, each of which contains ten balls, whose
color is either white or black. One of them is known to contain ve white balls
and ve black balls, while no information is given on the distribution of the balls
colors in the other urn. If the decision maker is asked to bet on the color of the
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rst ball drawn at random from either urn, which urn would she prefer for this
bet? The paradox arises because most people show a clear preference for the
knownurn, that is, for the urn containing ve white and ve black balls: they
are indi¤erent as to the color to bet on in both urns, but strictly prefer to bet on
the known urn rather than on the unknown one. This choice behavior cannot be
explained in the subjective expected utility (SEU) framework, since there is no
subjective (additive) prior supporting these preferences. In particular, people
showing this preference order do not act as if there were ve white and ve
black balls in the unknown urn (otherwise they would show indi¤erence), to the
same extent as our depositors do not act as if their place in line were equally
probable when fearing a bank run.
Our formalization of the depositors attitude towards uncertainty is inspired
by the multiple prior maxmin expected utility (MEU) theory axiomatized by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). This approach is a well-established generalization
of the SEU theory, which can accomodate the choice behavior of Ellsberg-type
situations, in which individuals are not able to estimate reliably probabilities.
In representing subjective beliefs, the MEU decision rule replaces the classic
single prior with a closed and convex set of priors (multi-prior beliefs). The agent
evaluates every act by computing the minimal expected utility over this set of
priors; she will then select the act which maximizes this minimal expected utility
(hence the phrase maxmin). The agent is said to be uncertainty averse if this
set is not a singleton. The application of this decision rule to our framework
leads us to assume a depositor who maximizes her expected pay-o¤with respect
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to the binary choice - whether or not to withdraw -, while selecting the worst
probability distribution (over her position in the queue) among all the admissible
ones. As we will see in the next section, since in a mechanism design approach
pay-o¤s generally vary as a function of the position number, uncertainty aversion
may alter the agents withdrawal strategy.
We will show that, coeteris paribus, cautious depositors (in the sense of
Gilboa-Schmeidler) are less willingto run and, hence, that panic-driven bank
runs may disappear once this conservative attitude towards uncertainty is taken
into account and incorporated into the model. A remarkable implication is that,
with purely maxmin depositors (in the sense of Wald (1950)), bank runs induced
by sunspots disappear completely, because these agents do never run indepen-
dently of what they think the others will do. Interestingly, the reason why
panic-driven bank runs vanish is exactly opposite to the one pointed out by
Green and Lin (2000) and criticized by Peck and Shell (2003): here depositors
know very littleabout their place in line and, because of that, they may be
dissuaded from running. Finally, a policy implication of our results is that bank-
ing mechanisms allowing for suspension schemes are worthy, not only because
they improve risk-sharing (Wallace (1990)), but also because they may eliminate
panic-driven bank runs in a potentially general class of banking models.
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2 Aversion to Uncertainty and Propensity to
Run
The banking model developed in Peck and Shell (2003) is characterized by ag-
gregate uncertainty on the distribution of the agents type and by the observance
of the so-called sequential service constraint (which forces the bank to deal with
customers sequentially). There are three periods, and N potential depositors,
 being the number of impatients and N    that of patients. Each of them is
endowed with y units of consumption in period 0 regardless of type. Impatient
agents evaluate utility of period 1 only, through a function u(c1), while patient
agents, who are allowed to costlessly store consumption across periods, evaluate
utility of both periods 1 and 2 through the function v(c1+ c2), where c1 and c2
represent respectively consumption received in periods 1 and 2: Both functions
are assumed to be strictly increasing, concave, and twice continuously di¤eren-
tiable. The bank, whose target is to maximize the ex-ante expected utility of
consumers3 , knows the probability distribution over the possible realizations of
types [f() for  = 0; 1; :::; N ] and, as usual, is not able to recognize the agents
type. As to technology, 1 unit of consumption invested in period 0 yields R
units in period 2 and 1 unit in period 1. As a consequence of the technology
and preference assumptions, in autarchy patient depositors strictly prefer to
consume in period 2.
In Peck and Shell (2003) an essential distinction is made between pre- and
3The implicit assumption here is the existence of a perfectly competitive banking sector.
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post-deposit game. In the latter consumers are assumed to have already de-
posited their endowments and, after learning their type (at the beginning of
period 1), must only decide whether to withdraw in period 1 or in period 2.
The pre-deposit game also encompasses the agents choice between deposit and
autarchy: this choice is indeed not trivial since, for instance, the agent would
decide not to deposit if she had the belief that a bank run would occur. Here
we focus on the post-deposit game: all the ndings about the pre-deposit game
obtained in Peck and Shell (2003) apply, mutatis mutandis, to our framework
as well.
Our departure from the standard framework is concerned with the subjective
prior of the depositor relative to her position in the queue. In Peck and Shell
(2003) the agent evaluates each place in line as equally likely independently of
whether or not a bank run is expected. Conversely, for the reasons stated in
the introduction we allow probabilities to vary across position numbers when-
ever depositors believe that a run is about to occur. Following the Gilboa and
Schmeidlers (1989) MEU principle, we further assume that, when a bank run
is expected
1. the agents subjective belief about her own position in the queue is mod-
eled as a set of additive probability measures (multiple prior belief);
2. the agents choice behavior is represented as a maxmin strategy, which
leads her to evaluate the pay-o¤ associated with withdrawing in period 1 ac-
cording to the worst prior.
The depositors strategy is taken into account by the bank when designing
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the optimal contract. Inside the set M of feasible banking mechanisms, the
optimal mechanism m
m = (c1(1); :::; c1(z); :::; c1(N); c2(0); :::; c2(N   1))
(where z refers to the depositors position in the queue) is the set of pay-o¤s
which maximizes total welfare - dened as the sum of the utilities of the two
types weighted by the probabilities of all possible realizations - subject to the
resource constraint and to an incentive compatibility constraint (ICC)4 . ICC
ensures that patient depositors, in comparing the expected pay-o¤ associated
with the truth tellingstrategy (withdrawing in period 2) to the one associated
with the strategy of lying(withdrawing in period 1), prefer to tell the truth.
The economy may be subject to a panic-driven run when ICC holds and the
following condition, called no-bank run condition (NBC), is violated:
NX
z=1
qz(m
)v(c1(z))  v
 "
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
#
R
!
(NBC)
where qz is the depositors prior of her position in the queue which minimizes -
over a set of given priors - her expected pay-o¤ from running5 . NBC states that,
even though the patient depositor had the belief that any other agent would be
running, she would be however interested in waiting until period 2. We can now
state the following proposition.
4Since we do not need the formal representation of the banking problem to derive our
results, we prefer to state it explicitely in the appendix.
5See the appendix for a more formal treatment.
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Proposition 1 For the post-deposit game there always exists a positive measure
set of minimizing priors which makes the bank run equilibrium disappear.
Proof. Assume the following set of priors:
qz 2 [0 + "; 1  "] for " 2 [0; 1
N
) and 8z = 1; :::; N (1)
Also assume that the lowest pay-o¤ in period 1 be strictly higher than 0, and
-w.l.o.g., as it will be argued below - that weak PSC characterizes the optimal
mechanism m:
c1(1)  c1(2)  :::  c1(N   1)  Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
The relation above identies two possible cases.
1. The optimal solution is
c1(1) = c1(2) = ::: = c1(N   1) = Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z) (2)
In this case the minimizing distribution is anyone among all possible additive
distributions belonging to the set dened in (1). Then the NBC becomes
v
 
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
!
< v
" 
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
!
R
#
which is always satised 8R > 0 and no bank run can occur. Notice that (2)
corresponds to the autarchic solution.
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2. In the optimal solution, at least one pay-o¤ is strictly greater than the
others. Suppose (w. l. o. g.) that
c1(1)  c1(2)  :::  c1(N   1) > Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
In this case the minimizing prior with respect to (1) would be
[qz = " 8z = 1; :::; N   1; qN = 1  (N   1)"]
and the NBC becomes
N 1X
z=1
"v(c1(z))+[1  (N   1)"] v

Ny  
N 1P
z=1
c1(z)

< v
" 
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
!
R
#
We argue that, 8R > 0, there is at least an " > 0 that satises the condition
stated above. The threshold value of " below which the bank run disappears is
0 < " =
v

Ny  
N 1P
z=1
c1(z)

R

  v

Ny  
N 1P
z=1
c1(z)

N 1P
z=1
v(c1(z))  (N   1)v

Ny  
N 1P
z=1
c1(z)

Notice also that the assumption of PSC has been made w.l.o.g. Indeed suppose
that the pay-o¤ associated with the last position is not the minimum because
there exists
v(c1(i)) < v
 
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
!
for some i 2 [1; N   1]
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then it will also be
v(c1(i)) < v
 
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
!
< v
" 
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
!
R
#
and the reasoning of the proof can be repeated identically.
Notice immediately that, when the risk of a bank run vanishes (due to the
depositorsuncertain beliefs), the unique equilibrium for the post-deposit game
is also the unique equilibrium for the pre-deposit game: the bank simply o¤ers
the optimal contract, and all the agents decide to deposit their endowments,
and to withdraw them according to their true type.
An interesting corollary of this proposition is that, under the maxmin return
criterion (Wald (1950)), panic-driven bank runs cease to exist. Whenever pa-
tient depositors fear that the worst case is going to happen, they will commit
themselves to a truth telling strategy no matter what (they think) the others do.
The proof is straightforward and can be obtained from the one above by setting
" = 0. This condition would in fact give rise to the following unrestricted set
of priors (which always characterizes these types of decision makers): q^z 2 [0; 1]
8z = 1; :::; N: The minimization over this set will lead to assign probability 1 to
the worst position in the queue and 0 to all the others.
As a result, banking mechanisms would be again immune to sunspot-induced
runs as in Green and Lin (2000) but, somewhat paradoxically, for the opposite
reason: while there the assumption that each depositor knows her place in line
lies behind the backward induction argument which makes bank run equilibria
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disappear, here it is the strong uncertainty and a highly conservative attitude
towards it which discourage depositors from running.
We have provided a theoretical argument in favor of the implementation of
suspension schemes in banking contracts, which adds to the classicargument
provided by Wallace (1990). Wallace proved that, in conditions of aggregate
uncertainty on the distribution of the agents type, the possibility of design-
ing more sophisticated contracts - including suspension schemes - increases the
depositorswelfare by improving risk-sharing among them. We claim that, if
depositors - in a situation in all respects similar to the one giving rise to the
Ellsberg paradox - hold pessimistic beliefs upon their position in the queue
when expecting a run, these suspension schemes can also make these contracts
immune to panic-driven bank runs.
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A Appendix
In this Section we formulate the optimal problem solved by the bank. We
rst need the following denition: conditional on an agents being patient, the
probability that the number of impatient agents is  can be expressed as
fp() =
h
1  
N
i
f()
N 1P
0=0

1  
0
N

f(0)
for  = 0; 1; :::; N . The optimal mechanism m is found by maximizing the
expected welfare of depositors:
max
[c1(1);::::;c1(N 1)]
W =
N 1X
=0
f()
2664 X
z=1
u(c1(z)) + (N   )v
0BB@

Ny  
P
z=1
c1(z)

R
N   
1CCA
3775+
+f(N)
"
N 1X
z=1
u(c1(z)) + u
 
Ny  
N 1X
z=1
c1(z)
!#
subject to the following incentive compatibility constraint (the resource con-
straint is already incorporated into the objective function):
s:t:
N 2X
=0
fp()
"
1
+ 1
+1X
z=1
v(c1(z))
#
+ fp(N   1)
"
NX
z=1
qz(m
)v(c1(z))
#

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
N 1X
=0
fp()v
0BB@

Ny  
P
z=1
c1(z)

R
N   
1CCA
where
qz(m
) = argmin
(
NX
z=1
qzv(c
1(z))
)
s:t:
NX
z=1
qz = 1
s:t:qz 2

qlz; q
h
z
8z = 1; :::; n and qlz < qhz
The superscripts l and h stand respectively for lowand high and delimit
the extension of priors. qz is the minimizing prior which the bank takes into
account when choosing the optimal contract.
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